subsequent behaviour were consistently low, leading Caryl to conclude that displays are of only limited use in gaining information about the motivational state of the opponent. Other studies have led to similar conclusions (see, for instance, the classic study of agonistic encounters between Betta splendens males by Simpson, 1968) .
(2) Information contained in displays is not indicative of intention. Obviously, animals display during confrontations, and in the technical sense, displays carry information. However, the information may not be "about" intention or motivational state. Maynard Smith (1974 Smith ( , 1982 has argued on theoretical grounds that the signalling of intention or motivational state could not be stable since "cheaters", utilizing a bluffing strategy could easily invade. Signalling an opponent honestly about one's resource holding power (RHP, Parker 1974 ) is a stable strategy so long as the cost of bluffing a signal that indicates a greater RHP is large (Maynard Smith 1982) . Empirical studies have shown that signals that correlate well with RHP are common (e.g. Davies and Halliday 1979, Clutton-Brock and Albon 1979) .
Recently, in a discussion of signalling capacity, Enquist (1985) pointed out the distinction between the variation in choice of behaviours and variation in quality of behaviours. This is an extremely important distinction inasmuch as information is unavoidably conveyed by the latter, even if this information is disadvantageous, for instance revealing low status or RHP. Although this is an important point in identifying different kinds of signals, information about real status (conveyed by performance) is invariably confounded with information about intent, and vice versa.
4
(3) To the extent that any information relevant to intentions or motivational state is present in displays, opponents should ignore it. This is the logical extension of Maynard Smith's line of argument on theoretical grounds. The presence of "cheaters" in a population renders any reliable signal suspect, in much the same way that a flush of counterfeit bills would increase skepticism among bank tellers. In other words, if the cost of bluffing is low, soon it pays everyone to bluff and the signal no longer conveys information.
We contend that much of the analysis of agonistic encounters between animals has been handicapped by assumptions that are too simplistic. This is as true of empirical studies as those concerned entirely with theory. An important component of all animal behaviour is assessment (Parker 1974, Parker and Rubenstein 1981) , yet the strategic aspects of assessment are rarely incorporated into models. Because the techniques used to analyse the evolution of agonistic behaviour demanded it, the assessment phase of encounters has typically been modeled in such a way that players can not alter their behaviour based on information gained during the contest. In reality, opponents often go through many evident phases of display before any eventual outcome occurs. Studies that have attempted to model sequential features of behaviour have had to do so in a piecemeal fashion (Leimar and Enquist, 1984) , and empirical studies have not been designed with this important aspect in mind.
We analyze a simple confrontation by extensive form, and show how and under what conditions a mixed ESS of bluffing and an informative signal might evolve. This result is difficult to obtain using the analysis of normal form games. In general, we 5 6 assign a cost to bluffing but keep it low in relation to the cost of losing a fight. We also consider an information index that reflects the knowledge an individual possesses about his own role in relation to his opponent, and allow for information asymmetries. Finally, we re-evaluate a study of agonistic encounters between male fiddler crabs, Uca (Hyatt and Salmon 1978 and in light of the predictions from the theory.
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
To begin, several definitions will be helpful. Role refers to a combination of variables describing the players, e.g., relative size and ownership status ("large owner"). Individual variables are referred to as aspects of a role (Hammerstein, 1981) . Roles are distinguished from types by the fact that the latter are invariant, whereas roles are defined only within the context of a particular encounter. Resource Holding Power (RHP) is the absolute ability of an individual to win an escalated contest (Parker 1974) . Signals are defined here as transmissions that manipulate an opponents behaviour (Krebs & Dawkins 1984) . A contest is an encounter between two animals in conflict over the possession of a resource. In our model, contests consist of two stages, a signalling stage and an attack or withdraw stage. This is a special case of a more general result due to Selten 1980) . Suppose that every player in a game knows his own role, and also knows that his opponent is in a different role. Then any ESS must involve only pure strategies. In the present model, we relax Selten's assumptions; not every player need know his own role. With this relaxation, mixed strategy ESS's are once again possible (see for example Hammerstein and Parker 1982) .
The condition of complete information is stringent. It leaves no logical room for signalling to convey information about roles. We expect incomplete information games to arise in any environment where players are uncertain about roles. Only in incomplete information games is signalling likely to evolve. We will show below how signalling is an integral part of the ESS for a class of incomplete information games.
These concepts can be extended in a straightforward fashion to information about more than a single role asymmetry. For some role asymmetries, such as resource holding power, the potential for informational asymmetry is considerable. For other asymmetries, such as resident/intruder, the role situation is usually much clearer and informational asymmetries are less likely to arise. Thus, one could have symmetric information with respect to one role aspect and asymmetric information with respect to another. In the model below, there is complete information about the resident/intruder asymmetry but incomplete information about RHP.
SIGNALLING IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
The extensive form of a game is the appropriate model to choose for any encounter in which the sequence of moves is important. Selten (1983) case, he knows exactly where he is in the game tree. phenomena of assessmemt and bluffing, which are the concerns of our study.
ESS OF A SIGNALLING GAME
In this section we give a specific interpretation to the roles A and B and supply a continuation of the signalling game, based on Hawk vs. Dove. We then solve for the ESS using the extensive form. We find two ESS behavioural regimes depending on the values of the parameters in the payoff functions. At one of these regimes, the behaviour of the informed player conveys information to the other player about the roles; at the other, behaviours conveys no such information.
Let role A represents high RHP and role B low RHP. Player 1 is known by both players to be the resident on a territory of value V. Both players know that player 2 is an intruder on this territory. In a contest, the player with the higher RHP wins. The cost to a loser of a contest is C. An intruder also has the option of leaving the territory before a contest at no cost. Player 1 moves first, signalling either left (strong) or right (weak). A rough translation of these signals might be "I am strong, don't waste time" and "I am Such signalling behaviour is completely informative, since the signal tells the intruder everything there is to know about the role situation. Our first result is that completely informative signalling is not evolutionarily stable, and can be invaded by bluffers. Conversely, the aggressive signal strong given by a low RHP resident (role B) is misinformative, since such a player is sure to lose his territory if attacked. We shall term these two kinds of behaviour trap passing and bluffing, respectively. We draw these terms from poker, which has an analogous strategic nature. Just as in poker, where a bluff commits a player to a showdown if called, a bluffing resident is committed to a serious fight if attacked. Again, the cost 16 Regime I. This is the behaviour regime where V/C is low:
In this part of the parameter space, b = (1,1,0,0) is the ESS.
The resident always signals strong, and the intruder always retreats. To see why this is an equilibrium, note first of all that the signal is completely uninformative. Since every resident signals strong, this cannot convey any information to an intruder about the resident's RHP. Thus, an intruder faces the choice between attacking and expecting the payoff
or retreating and assuring himself of the payoff zero. Given Regime II. This is the behaviour regime where V/C is high:
In this part of the parameter space, b = (1,P,Q,1) is the ESS, where p and 3 are defined by
and
Residents with high RHP continue to signal strong, since signalling strong costs less than signalling weak and they win a contest in any case. Low RHP residents however signal strong only with probability p given by (6). Such signalling behaviour does convey information to the intruders. The signal weak informs the intruder that he has the higher RHP, so that the * intruder always attacks when the signal weak is given. When the intruder observes the signal strong, he now attacks with probability g, given by (7) .
The argument for these mixed strategy behaviours is as follows. Even the signal strong is informative and updates player 2's information. The conditional probability that strong was signalled by a high RHP resident is no longer x but
Conversely, the conditional probability that strong was signalled by a low RHP resident is
The expected payoff of attacking in the face of the signal strong (using (7) and (8)) is equal to
As before, the expected payoff of retreating is 0. At a mixed strategy equilibrium, these two payoffs (equation 10 and 0) must be equal; (6) then follows from (10). As far as the resident with low RHP is concerned, the expected payoff from signalling strong is
since he is attacked and loses with probability g.
Alternatively, the low RHP resident can signal weak and guarantee himself the payoff 0. Equating (11) with zero, one has (7) .
These results are summarized in Table 1 . A high RHP resident gets the value of the territory V in either regime. A low RHP resident gets the value of the territory less signalling cost (Vs) in the all-bluffing regime, but only expects 0 payoff in the partial-bluffing regime. Finally, intruders get the payoff 0 in either regime.
DISCUSSION
The asymmetric extensive form game model we have presented has an ESS in which signalling and bluffing are evolutionarily stable behaviours. Specifically, under the assumptions of the model, signalling evolves when information is not complete.
Bluffing becomes more prevalent as the value of the contested resource increases in relation to the cost of losing a fight for the resource, if the degree of uncertainty in the system is held constant.
To appraise the applicability of these results, we highlight the assumptions of the model with relation to the fighting behaviour of fiddler crabs, Uca pugilator and U. pugnox (Hyatt & Salmon 1978 and . In U. pugilator, males defend burrows with displays and fights. While residents win the majority of contests, their advantage is not absolute. When the intruders win, they are larger than the resident and these contests usually involve more forceful acts. Hyatt and Salmon classified the behaviours into forceful and ritualized acts.
They identified four stages in the fiddler crab contests. In our model we collapse their four stages into two. In the first stage, the signal (strong or weak) is ritualized, while in the second stage the behaviour is forceful (attack or retreat). A two-stage game is the logical minimum for modelling information transfer.
The role asymmetry includes resident/intruder and high 19 RHP/low RHP. For the information asymmetry, we assume that the resident (player 1) has more information than the intruder. In U. pucrilator the intruder approaches and acts first by pushing on the resident with his claw (Hyatt and Salmon 1978) , a contact that allows the resident to assess RHP of the intruder. The contest we have modeled begins after the resident has had the opportunity to assess the intruder.
The most likely cost of losing a fight in U. pugilator is an increase in the risk of predation. If a predator is attracted to the contestants, a resident can escape to his burrow, while the intruder is left exposed. When contests advance to forceful acts, males rarely show signs of physical injury. It is reasonable to assume that the cost of a signal inconsistent with RHP is much less than the cost of losing a fight, C » s, since these signals are to some extent ritualized displays. The burrows are necessary for a male to mate, justifying the assumption that V >> s.
In assigning the cost of signalling, we have assumed that giving misinformation is in some way more expensive than giving correct information. It has been suggested that "(a)11 signals are products of coevolution between manipulation and salesresistance (Krebs & Dawkins 1984) ." Since signals are probably complex, in that the receiver uses more than one criterion to assess the opponent, we have assumed that the misinformer has to overcome any information he may inadvertently send about his actual RHP by exaggerating the signal. Krebs and Dawkins (1984) also discuss the repetitive nature of animal displays in terms of manipulation, propaganda, persuasion or advertising. In this sense, a small resident may need to put more energy into a signal 20 to persuade a large intruder to retreat.
We predict that the occurrence of bluffing is dependent on the value of the resource in relation to the cost of losing a fight for the resource, V/C and the information asymmetry as parameterized by x (see Figure 5 ). In particular, holding C and x constant for low V, all low RHP individuals bluff roaring red deer, Clutton-Brock and Albon 1979). In both of these examples, the cost of signalling is high, and therefore bluffing would be expensive. There are also examples, however, of signals for which the cost to bluffing would be low and yet the signals still convey information. For example Rohwer (1975 Rohwer ( , 1977 and Ketterson (1979) address the question of status signaling by plumage variability (low cost) and the apparent lack of convergence on signalling "dominant". Maynard Smith (1982) has reasoned that if bluffing does not have a high cost, bluffing 22 invades and soon it pays for oponents to ignore the signal. The use of extensive form and the behavioural adjustment it allows, leads to a very different result. Even with a small cost to bluffing, a population can remain in the partial-bluffing regime.
Incompleteness and asymmetry of information, with the associated informative signalling, are responsible.
Information asymmetries about roles should occur in systems where repeated encounters with the same individual are rare or where roles are highly dependent on previous outcomes. In systems where this is not the case, multiple threat displays may evolve via the mechanism pointed out by Andersson (198 0) . Walton and Nolan (1986) discuss the effects of imperfect and asymmetric information on the territorial behaviour of male prairie warblers (Dendroica discolor). In most of the cases they observed, the previous owner of a territory won. However the role of intruder and resident was confounded by seasonal nature of the territories. If at the beginning of a season the previous resident and the intruder arrive at the territory simultaneously, there is the possiblity of misperceptions about relative roles.
In the case when the intruder won, his behaviour suggests he misperceived his role in relation to the previous resident.
In this paper, we have addressed the question of animal 
